Tenancy is a software platform spinning out of WareSpace that productizes the leasing operation we built internally — accelerating WareSpace lease-up while creating a category-defining standalone asset whose terminal value, in our base case, exceeds the entire current WareSpace real estate portfolio.
When commercial real estate professionalized in the eighties and nineties, every function got institutional-grade infrastructure except one. Acquisitions got investment committees. Construction got general contractors and capex governance. Operations got Yardi, AppFolio, RealPage, MRI. Maintenance got capital expenditure schedules. Marketing and leasing got a part-time coordinator and a broker on commission.
This was not an oversight. It was rational behavior at the time. When you bought a well-located warehouse in 1995, it leased itself. The brokerage layer monopolized tenant information, so operators paid the four to six percent commission tax in exchange for distribution. The model worked because there was no better alternative.
Three changes have invalidated the model. E-commerce reshaped tenant demand and created tens of thousands of new leasing surfaces brokerage networks were never built to serve. Google killed the broker information monopoly — tenants now search "warehouse near me" before they call anyone. AI Overviews now intercept tenant searches before any human-mediated channel sees them. The category is thirty years behind its own market. The institutional REITs are not catching up because their internal incentives do not reward it. The independent operators cannot catch up alone because they lack the engineering and capital to build what is needed.
Across seven institutional REITs operating more than 2.4 billion square feet of industrial real estate, zero appear in the top organic search results for "warehouse for rent" in any of the six largest U.S. industrial markets we tested. Sixty positions surveyed. Zero institutional REITs. The flex operators and the listing aggregators own the entire SERP.
Three explicit mechanisms convert the operating substrate WareSpace built into compounding economic value across both entities.
Marketing spend that is currently expensed inside WareSpace becomes deferred revenue inside Tenancy at SaaS multiples. The same dollar that was OpEx producing leases becomes ARR producing enterprise value.
The platform compresses lease-up curves by approximately eight months per building. On a 50-building portfolio, this is materially more in NOI and stabilized cap-rate exit value than the platform costs to run inside WareSpace.
Tenancy can be sold separately at SaaS multiples uncorrelated with real estate cap rates, or held as a recurring-revenue asset on top of the operating portfolio. Optionality compounds.
Bear, base, and bull cases for Tenancy as a standalone entity. Pricing assumes a 60/40 DWY/DFY blend in early years, shifting toward 70 percent DFY by year four.
| Year | Bear customers | Bear ARR | Base customers | Base ARR | Bull customers | Bull ARR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | 4 | $1.0M | 8 | $2.2M | 12 | $3.8M |
| 2027 | 15 | $3.5M | 32 | $8.5M | 50 | $15.0M |
| 2028 | 38 | $9.5M | 78 | $22.0M | 120 | $40.0M |
| 2029 | 65 | $18.0M | 135 | $42.0M | 210 | $78.0M |
| 2030 | 95 | $28.0M | 195 | $67.0M | 310 | $130.0M |
Base case assumes 30 percent net revenue retention growth annually plus 50-60 net new logos per year by year three. These growth rates are below the median of public B2B SaaS comparables (Salesforce, HubSpot, ServiceTitan, Procore — all of which exceeded 50 percent NRR plus new-logo growth in their early scaling years).
| Case | 2030 ARR | Multiple | Standalone Tenancy EV |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | $28M | 5× | $140M |
| Base | $67M | 8× | $540M |
| Bull | $130M | 11× | $1.4B |
WareSpace trades at real estate multiples (cap-rate-driven, ~12-15× NOI). Tenancy will trade at software multiples (8-12× ARR). This is a permanent structural arbitrage between two different asset classes. The opportunity is not to choose between them — Jadian already owns the real estate. The opportunity is to additionally own the software asset that the real estate portfolio uniquely positioned us to build.
The substrate continues to produce faster lease-up and lower cost-per-tour inside the WareSpace portfolio. The investment converts to operational alpha at WareSpace. Downside is bounded by a single-operator outcome that is already strong.
The moat is the corpus and the closed loops. The patterns visible in our output do not reveal the engine that produced them. Twenty-four months of head start compound while a competitor builds their own. Tenancy retains category-naming credit and the operator-credibility moat regardless.
Tenancy is more valuable in a soft market, not less. Demand-generation infrastructure becomes essential when buildings do not fill themselves. WareSpace and any operator-customer benefit asymmetrically when supply exceeds demand.
Downside is bounded by single-operator economics that already work. Upside is asymmetric and structurally compounding. This is the bet PE firms underwrite well.
Detailed deal terms are subject to negotiation; the framework below represents our recommended starting position.
Engineering team (5-7 hires), sales team (2 AEs + 1 SDR + leadership), GTM marketing, 18 months runway.
Five to eight strategic angel checks from operator-investors in CRE, real estate technology, and B2B vertical SaaS.
WareSpace as anchor customer at 50 percent of standard pricing. Perpetual platform license. Reference rights. Industrial-vertical exclusivity.
WareSpace was built to deliver yield to Jadian on a real estate thesis. In the process of building it, we discovered a software asset with the potential to deliver returns on a different and complementary thesis. Capitalizing Tenancy is not a departure from the WareSpace investment — it is an extension of it, into the asset class that the WareSpace operating model uniquely qualifies us to build.